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The physical effort required to seek out and extract a resource is an important
consideration for a foraging animal. A second consideration is the variability or risk
associated with resource delivery. An intriguing observation from ethological studies is
that animals shift their preference from stable to variable food sources under conditions of
increased physical effort or falling energetic reserves. Although theoretical models for this
effect exist, no exploration into its biological basis has been pursued. Recent advances
in understanding the neural basis of effort- and risk-guided decision making suggest
that opportunities exist for determining how effort influences risk preference. In this
review, we describe the intersection between the neural systems involved in effort- and
risk-guided decision making and outline two mechanisms by which effort-induced changes
in dopamine release may increase the preference for variable rewards.
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INTRODUCTION
Foraging animals must often consider the variability or risk asso-
ciated with resource delivery. For example, the preference for
variable as opposed to stable sources of food can change dramat-
ically based on a number of factors, such as an animal’s current
energetic state. In the case of food delivery, animals can express
a preference for variable or “risky” food sources when the ener-
getic demands of foraging are high (Caraco, 1981; Caraco et al.,
1990). Juncos, for instance, prefer seed-bins with variable over
fixed reinforcement schedules when ambient temperatures fall
and metabolic demands rise (Caraco et al., 1990; but see Brito
E Abreu and Kacelnik, 1999). Similarly, rats consuming high-
calorie foods exhibit a reduced preference for variable schedules
of reinforcement relative to groups of rats consuming low-calorie
foods (Craft et al., 2011). Energetic expenditure due to physical
effort can also enhance risk preference. For example, a study by
Kirshenbaum et al. (2003) investigated the interaction between
effort and risk in rats where effort was presented in the form of
running in wheels with low (50 g) or high (120 g) spinning resis-
tances. Risk was measured as the preference for variable or fixed
schedules of reinforcement. The authors divided rats into high-
effort and low-effort groups and observed that the high-effort
group expressed a preference for variable reinforcement relative
to the low-effort group. One explanation for this effect is the Daily
Energy Budget (DEB) or Z-score rule (Stephens, 1981; Houston,
1991). According to this theory, when animals approach a critical
energetic state (e.g., starvation), they choose to gamble by invest-
ing their remaining resources on a variable option that may yield
a life-saving gain. This rule also states that organisms with ade-
quate and stable energetic reserves will not make the gamble as
they are better served by low-risk options that guarantee survival
(For a thorough and critical review see Kacelnik and Bateson,
1996).
To our knowledge, no investigation into the neural basis for the
influence of energetic state or physical effort on risk preference
has been performed. Consequently, almost nothing is known
regarding the neural basis for interactions between effort and
risk. Opportunities do exist to explore this question given recent
advances in the study of the neural basis of effort- and risk-
guided decision making (Reviewed in Walton et al., 2006; Platt
and Huettel, 2008; Salamone et al., 2012). These studies have
identified a range of structures and neuromodulators involved in
perceiving and setting the preference to exert effort or to pur-
sue risky options. Surprisingly, the divergent networks involved
in effort and risk intersect in a restricted set of cortical and
subcortical structures; themost prominent being the anterior cin-
gulate cortex (ACC), the basolateral amygdala (BLA), the nucleus
accumbens (NAC), and the mesolimbic dopaminergic system.
Given the considerable evidence for the role of these systems in
setting the preference for both effort and risk, we believe that
interactions between these structures underlie the capacity of
physical effort to increase risk preference. To argue this point, we
first review evidence that the neural processes involved in effort-
guided (section Experimental Approaches for Studying Effort-
Guided Behaviors, Cortical and Sub-Cortical Circuits Involved
in Effort-Guided Behaviors and Dopamine and Effort-Guided
Behavior) and risk-guided (section Neural Systems Involved in
Setting The Preference for Risk) decisionmaking intersect in these
systems, and conclude with the discussion of a proposed neu-
ral mechanism by which effort increases the preference for risk,
where risk preference is defined as a preference for variable over
certain rewards.
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EXPERIMENTAL APPROACHES FOR STUDYING
EFFORT-GUIDED BEHAVIORS
An underlying assumption of most investigations of effort-guided
decision making is that effort is a cost to be minimized. This is a
reasonable assumption given that many species balance energetic
losses from physical effort against food intake in order to max-
imize net energetic gain (Stephens et al., 2007). Bautista et al.
(2001) explored this issue in an experiment in which starlings
choose between either walking (low effort) in search of low-yield
rewards or flying (high effort) to reach larger rewards. Analysis
of choice behavior in response to manipulations of reward mag-
nitude and flight distance indicated that starlings optimized net
energetic gain by shifting their preference between walking and
flying. Similarly, food-restricted rats alter their preference for
high-effort/high-reward and low-effort/low-reward options in
ways that indicate that they treat effort as a cost (Reviewed in
Walton et al., 2006; Salamone et al., 2012). In most neurobio-
logical experiments, effort is manipulated using either lever-press
behaviors coupled with variable or fixed-ratio schedules of rein-
forcement (Floresco et al., 2008; Walton et al., 2009) or barrier-
climbing tasks where animals are required to select between paths
on a maze that lead to combinations of effort (the presence of
a 30–40 cm barrier) and reward (e.g., Salamone, 1994; Bardgett
et al., 2009; Cowen et al., 2012). Importantly, results from a num-
ber of studies suggest that the observed aversion to effort reported
in these studies is not due to an aversion to temporal delays pro-
duced by the time required to lever-press or jump over barriers
(Rudebeck et al., 2006; Floresco et al., 2008; Walton et al., 2009).
What follows is a review of the involvement of neural systems in
effort-guided behaviors, with a focus on those systems that are
also implicated in processing risk.
CORTICAL AND SUB-CORTICAL CIRCUITS INVOLVED IN
EFFORT-GUIDED BEHAVIORS
Results from studies that have selectively targeted cortical and
subcortical structures, either through lesions or through phar-
macological manipulations, suggest the existence of a network
involved in effort-guided decision making; with the principal
nodes of this network being localized in the ACC, BLA, and NAC.
For example, lesions or inactivation of the ACC result in animals
avoiding previously preferred high-effort/high-reward options on
the barrier-climbing task (Walton et al., 2003; Rudebeck et al.,
2006; Floresco and Ghods-Sharifi, 2007). Notably, the placement
of a second barrier on the formerly low-effort arm results in
lesioned animals returning to the high-reward/high-effort option
(Walton et al., 2002), suggesting that the observed shift in prefer-
ence is not a consequence of an inability to climb the barrier or
in capacity to recall reward values. This effect does not appear
to extend to prefrontal regions ventral to the ACC as lesions
of the prelimbic (Walton et al., 2003) and orbitofrontal cortex
(Rudebeck et al., 2006) do not result in effort-avoidance. Similar
patterns of effort-avoidance have been observed following dis-
ruption of subcortical regions such as the NAC and BLA. For
example, effort avoidance has been reported in rats perform-
ing lever-press tasks following muscimol/baclofen inactivation
of the NAC core (Ghods-Sharifi and Floresco, 2010) and on
barrier-climbing tasks following the infusion of dopaminergic
antagonists into the NAC (Salamone et al., 1994) or 6-OHDA
dopamine depletion of the NAC (Mai et al., 2012). Similarly,
muscimol/baclofen inactivation of the BLA (Ghods-Sharifi et al.,
2009) on a lever-press task and excitotoxic lesions of the BLA in a
barrier-climbing task (Ostrander et al., 2011) also produce effort-
aversion in rats. Taken together, these data suggest the presence
of a distributed cortical-subcortical network for effort process-
ing. A schematic of this network along with possible modes of
interaction is presented in Figure 1.
Although experiments such as those described above have
identified individual structures involved in effort-related pro-
cessing, little is known regarding the specific roles these struc-
tures play in effort-guided decision making or how interactions
between structures influence behavior. Important steps in this
direction have been made through the investigation of the behav-
ioral consequences of the functional disconnection of structures
within this “effort network.” For example, the functional discon-
nection of the BLA and ACC through the targeted inactivation
of the BLA/ACC in contralateral hemispheres (disconnecting
within-hemisphere communication) results in a degree of effort-
avoidance that is similar to the degree observed following bilateral
ACC or BLA lesions (Floresco and Ghods-Sharifi, 2007). In this
study, lesions were in the most caudal region of the BLA, a region
that does not receive significant input from the ACC (Sesack
et al., 1989). This suggests that information could move from the
BLA to the ACC during effort-guided decision making. Evidence
for directional flow of information from the BLA to the ACC,
along with an established role of the BLA in ascribing positive
and negative affective values to stimuli and outcomes (Baxter
and Murray, 2002) indicates that information about the effort-
discounted value of rewards could be transferred from the BLA
to the ACC during decision making (Floresco and Ghods-Sharifi,
2007). The ACC, given its role in integrating sensory and motor
information in the service of action-selection (Shima and Tanji,
FIGURE 1 | Schematic of potential functions of neural systems within
the effort network. Results from studies in rodents and primates suggest
the involvement of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), basolateral amygdala
(BLA), nucleus accumbens (NAC), and dopamine neurons in the ventral
tegmental area (VTA) in effort-guided decision making. Captions in each box
indicate a proposed roles for each structure in effort-guided behavior and
arrows indicate possible routes of information flow. These routes are based
largely from the results of disconnection studies and anatomical studies
performed in rodents.
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1998; Kennerley et al., 2009), may utilize information about out-
come value from regions such as the BLA to bias action selection
toward high-value options (Walton et al., 2006). This interpreta-
tion, however, must be tempered as it is possible that the ACC
drives activity in the posterior BLA through indirect routes (e.g.,
through the anterior BLA). Future experiments involving simul-
taneous recording from the ACC and BLA during effort-guided
behavior could further elucidate the question of the direction of
information flow.
Interactions between the ACC and the NAC also appear to
influence effort-guided behaviors. For example, the excitotoxic
disconnection of the ACC and NAC core also results in effort-
avoidance on a barrier-climbing task (Hauber and Sommer,
2009). There are multiple routes through which an ACC-NAC
disconnection could disrupt inter-region communication. For
example, projections from the ACC to NAC exist (Zahm and
Brog, 1992; Voorn et al., 2004; Haber et al., 2006), although
these are relatively weak (Gabbott et al., 2005). A second route
is through the ventral tegmental area (VTA) as the ACC projects
to the VTA (Oades and Halliday, 1987) and given that ACC
stimulation is capable of activating VTA neurons (Gariano and
Groves, 1988), and the VTA, in turn, projects to the NAC (Oades
and Halliday, 1987). In contrast to the clear direct and indirect
projections from the ACC to the NAC, there are few projec-
tions from the NAC to the ACC (Hoover and Vertes, 2007),
suggesting that information flows from the ACC to the NAC
(Hauber and Sommer, 2009). The specific involvement of the
NAC in motivated approach behavior (Berridge and Robinson,
2003; Salamone et al., 2007) suggests that the NAC receives ACC
output related to the chosen action, and utilizes this information
to trigger or sustain an approach response.
In agreement with the proposed role of the ACC in action
selection (Shima and Tanji, 1998), the preceding results sug-
gests that the ACC integrates information about outcome values
from regions such as the BLA in order to guide decision mak-
ing. Support for a role of the ACC in action selection, however,
is weakened by recent physiological observations in rodents that
indicate that neural responses in the ACC to actions and to antic-
ipated effort actually occur after action selection (Cowen et al.,
2012). These observations are in agreement with an alternative
view of ACC involvement in sustaining goal-directed responses
across delays (Cowen et al., 2012). For example, Narayanan and
Laubach (2006) demonstrated that ACC activity is required for
sustaining a lever-press response in a time-estimation task. This
conclusion is further supported by observations from primate
studies that implicate the ACC inmaintaining actions across trials
(Kennerley et al., 2006; Hayden et al., 2011).
It must be cautioned that while these observations highlight
similarities between primates and rodents, such comparisons are
complicated by notable anatomical and functional differences
between species (Preuss, 1995; Uylings, 2003; but see Vogt and
Paxinos, 2012). For example, there is considerable evidence that
the primate ACC can be divided into motor, cognitive, and affec-
tive components along the dorso-ventral/posterior-anterior axis
(Barbas and De Olmos, 1990; Luppino et al., 1991; Bates and
Goldman-Rakic, 1993; Barbas and Blatt, 1995; Picard and Strick,
1996), with most studies of effort-driven responses in primates
targeting dorsal/motor regions (e.g., Kennerley et al., 2009).
Although anatomical divisions along the anterior-posterior axis
of the rodent ACC do appear to correspond generally to the divi-
sions reported in primates (Vogt and Paxinos, 2012), few studies
of behavioral/functional differences along this anterior-posterior
axis in the rodent ACC have been performed. Interestingly, dif-
ferences in motor sensitivity along the dorso-ventral axis of the
rodent medial prefrontal cortex have been observed, with indi-
vidual neurons in dorsal regions, including the ACC, exhibiting
the greatest sensitivity to movement (Cowen and McNaughton,
2007).
DOPAMINE AND EFFORT-GUIDED BEHAVIOR
Dopamine is traditionally viewed as a key modulator of reward-
driven learning; however, the observation that dopamine mod-
ulates effort-guided behaviors suggests that this view requires
elaboration (Wise, 2004; Salamone et al., 2012). For example,
physical exercise in the form of swimming and running on a
wheel or a treadmill and has been repeatedly associated with
increases in dopamine concentration (Reviewed in Meeusen and
De Meirleir, 1995). Such increases have been observed through-
out the striatum (Freed and Yamamoto, 1985; Hattori et al.,
1994; Meeusen et al., 1997), and a particularly strong relation-
ship between dopamine concentration and running speed has
been reported in the NAC (Freed and Yamamoto, 1985). In addi-
tion, rats receiving systemic administration of D1 (Bardgett et al.,
2009) and D2 antagonists (Denk et al., 2005; Floresco et al.,
2008; Bardgett et al., 2009; Salamone et al., 2012) shift their
preference away from high-effort/high-reward options to low-
effort/low-reward alternatives. Conversely, the application of the
dopaminergic agonist D-amphetamine biases responses toward
high-reward/high-effort options (Bardgett et al., 2009; but see
Floresco et al., 2008).
The influence of dopamine on effort depends on dopamine’s
effect on specific structures within the effort-network. For
instance, targeted 6-OHDA depletion of dopaminergic terminals
or blockade of dopamine receptors within the NAC (Salamone,
1994; Cousins et al., 1996; Ishiwari et al., 2004) and the ACC
(Schweimer and Hauber, 2006 but see Walton and Croxson,
2005) results in effort-avoidance during cost-benefit decision
making. Furthermore, results from a microdialysis study of stri-
atal dopamine during a random-ratio reinforcement task indi-
cates that slow fluctuations in dopamine concentration (minutes)
reflect an integration of factors such as motivational state (e.g.,
hunger) and the effort required to obtain rewards (Ostlund et al.,
2011). Taken together, these data indicate that dopamine concen-
tration within the ACC and the NAC influences the willingness
of animals to exert physical effort in exchange for valued rewards.
This function relates to recent theoretical proposals in which the
level of tonic dopamine release modulates response vigor and
response speed (Niv et al, 2005) as well as the estimation of
long-term reinforcement rates (Niv et al., 2007; Ostlund et al.,
2011).
Although there is clear evidence for a role of dopamine release
in the NAC in effort-guided behaviors, virtually nothing is known
regarding how this release is regulated. For example, the principal
source of dopaminergic innervation of the NAC is the VTA, and it
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is unknown what systems drive VTA activity during effort-guided
behaviors. The ACC could be involved given its capacity to trig-
ger burst-firing in dopaminergic neurons (Gariano and Groves,
1988), and the previously described role of the ACC in sustaining
motor actions (Narayanan et al., 2006; Cowen et al., 2012) would
suggest, somewhat indirectly, ACC involvement in sustaining a
dopaminergic response. An important path for future research is
the exploration of interactions between systems within the effort
network such as the ACC and BLA and the VTA.
Dopamine can modulate the activity of its targets across many
time scales (Schultz, 2007), and the time scale most relevant for
effort-guided behaviors has yet to be determined. For example,
dopamine neurons can express tonic and phasic modes of firing
activity (Grace, 1991), and these modes may play distinct roles in
modulating effort-guided behaviors. Tonic activity is associated
with slow release (seconds) of dopamine while phasic release is
associated with brief (∼300ms) bursts of firing activity that pro-
duces large but temporary increases in dopamine concentration
(Grace, 1991). There is some debate, however, regarding whether
changes in extracellular dopamine concentration results from
tonic or phasic release (Floresco et al., 2003; Owesson-White et al.,
2012). Functionally, tonic patterns of firing activity of dopamine
neurons have been associated with estimating the uncertainty
of reward delivery in primates (Fiorillo et al., 2003); while pha-
sic release is implicated in stimulus-driven orienting behaviors
(Dommett et al., 2005) and associative plasticity (Hollerman and
Schultz, 1998). Phasic and tonic patterns of release may also coop-
erate to regulate inter-region communication (Goto and Grace,
2005).
Little is known regarding the relative contribution of phasic
and tonic release to effort-guided behaviors; however, three recent
studies using fast scan cyclic voltammetry were unable to identify
a clear effect of effort on phasic responses within the NAC (Day
et al., 2010; Gan et al., 2010; Wanat et al., 2010). For example, two
of these studies were unable to identify significant phasic response
to effort-predictive cues in an instrumental task, but these studies
did identify clear phasic responses to reward-predictive cues (Gan
et al., 2010; Wanat et al., 2010). Furthermore, Day et al. (2010)
reported an unanticipated reduction of phasic NAC dopamine
release following increased effort. It is also unclear how short-
duration phasic responses could exert the sustained effect on
motivational state required to overcome costs such as physical
effort (Niv et al., 2007). A possible way to accommodate this
concern would be if phasic responses modulated the learning of
associations between effort, stimuli, and outcomes during early
stages of training as such learning could have lasting effects on
behavior. Future work in this area may yield important results
given considerable evidence for a role of phasic dopamine in
learning (Schultz et al., 1997; Waelti et al., 2001). Indeed, such
investigations may explain the difficult to resolve issue of how
effort, under the right conditions, can enhance the reinforc-
ing value of effort-associated cues, actions, and primary rewards
(Eisenberger, 1992; Zentall, 2010; Johnson and Gallagher, 2011).
The variable effects of dopamine on effort-guided behav-
iors and the different timescales at which dopamine influences
neural activity present significant challenges to researchers hop-
ing to create a unifying theory of function. These challenges
are compounded by experimental results that suggest that the
involvement of dopamine and theNAC in effort-guided behaviors
depends on the specific form of physical effort being employed.
For example, 6-OHDA depletion of NAC dopamine significantly
impairs effort-guided behavior when effort is assessed using
fixed-ratio schedules; however, the same dopaminergic manip-
ulation has no effect when effort is in the form of a weighted
lever (Ishiwari et al., 2004). One interpretation of these different
results is that NAC dopamine is required for sustaining effort over
time. This interpretation, however, does not fit well with results
fromT-maze barrier climbing tasks in which the time required for
expending effort within a trial is quite brief. Instead, dopamin-
ergic manipulations may be most effective when sequences of
effortful motor acts must be maintained. For example, the degree
of motor control required to press a weighted lever a single time
is probably similar to the control required for a single press of
an unweighted lever. In contrast, the control required to exe-
cute a single lever-press is probably considerably less than what
is required to sustain a repeating sequence of presses or, in the
case of barrier-climbing, in executing a complex jumping proce-
dure. This idea may relate to a formulation of decision-related
costs proposed by Shenhav et al. (2013) in which cost is the
degree to which control mechanisms must be engaged during a
behavior. The authors go further to suggest that the dorsal ACC
allocates control to a given mental or physical operation based
on the estimated value of the outcome. This value signal used in
this allocation process is suggested to arrive from regions such as
the amygdala, insula, and dopaminergic system (Shenhav et al.,
2013).
NEURAL SYSTEMS INVOLVED IN SETTING THE PREFERENCE
FOR RISK
Studies in humans, non-human primates, and rodents have
identified diverse cortical and subcortical structures involved
in setting the preference or aversion to risk. In human stud-
ies, the Iowa Gambling Task has become an established task
for investigating the neural basis for risk-guided decision mak-
ing (Bechara et al., 1994). In this task, subjects choose between
four decks of cards with the decks having different levels of
probabilistic gains and losses and different long-term returns.
Risk-preference is measured as a preference for suboptimal high-
risk/high-reward decks over optimal low-risk alternatives. A pref-
erence for high-risk options has been observed in patients with
damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and amygdala
(Bechara et al., 1994, 1999). Furthermore, BOLD activation of
the medial frontal gyrus, lateral orbitofrontal cortex, and insula
increases when subjects choose suboptimal high-risk options
(Lawrence et al., 2009).
A criticism of the use of the Iowa Gambling Task for assessing
risk-preference is that the task places multiple cognitive demands
upon subjects that are unrelated to risk. This is problematic as a
preference for risky alternatives or neural responses related to risk
preference could, in this task, result from a reduced capacity to
shift attention, to perform behavioral reversals, to process losses,
or to store items in working memory (Maia and McClelland,
2004; Dunn et al., 2006). To address this issue, some fMRI studies
in humans and most studies in non-human primates and rodents
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use paradigms that more directly assess the preference or aversion
to variability in reward delivery. These studies have implicated a
large number of structures in risk-guided decision making such
as the lateral frontal cortex (Tobler et al., 2009), medial prefrontal
cortex (St. Onge and Floresco, 2010), insula (Preuschoff et al.,
2008; Rudorf et al., 2012), posterior parietal cortex (Huettel et al.,
2006), ACC (Christopoulos et al., 2009; Kennerley et al., 2009),
posterior cingulate cortex (McCoy and Platt, 2005), VTA (Fiorillo
et al., 2003), putamen (Preuschoff et al., 2008), and ventral stria-
tum (Cardinal and Howes, 2005; Preuschoff et al., 2006; Stopper
et al., 2013).
Connecting results from human studies to results from studies
using non-human primates and rodents is a significant challenge
given the wide range of structures identified within and across
species. Even so, there are points of intersection. Interestingly,
many of these points of intersection include elements of the effort
network, such as the ACC, NAC, BLA, and dopamine (Amiez
et al., 2006; Behrens et al., 2007; Pais-Vieira et al., 2007; Platt
and Huettel, 2008; Preuschoff et al., 2008; Choi and Kim, 2010;
Fitzgerald et al., 2010; Rivalan et al., 2011; Schultz et al., 2011;
Zeeb and Winstanley, 2011). The following sections review the
involvement of these systems in risk-guided behaviors.
RISK AND THE ANTERIOR CINGULATE CORTEX
Multiple lines of evidence suggest a role of the primate ACC in
evaluating risk and in altering risk preference. In non-human pri-
mates, the spiking activity of subsets of ACC neurons changes
monotonically with the probability that a cue predicts reward
(Kennerley et al., 2009). In humans, BOLD activity in the ACC
increases prior to decisions involving risk (Labudda et al., 2008;
Weber and Huettel, 2008; Lawrence et al., 2009; Smith et al.,
2009). Furthermore, the combination of BOLD activation of the
ACC and striatum predicts risk-preference on subsequent trials
(Christopoulos et al., 2009), suggesting that ACC/striatal activa-
tion sets a baseline preference for risk. The ACC may specialize in
monitoring a form of risk known as volatility or “uncertain uncer-
tainty,” a form of uncertainty in which distributions andmeans of
outcome delivery are unknown (Rushworth and Behrens, 2008).
BOLD activity in the ACC scales with the amount of information
an outcome provides about the underlying outcome distribu-
tion (Behrens et al., 2007). For a foraging animal, adapting to
volatility is important as it determines how much weight to place
on the history of reward delivery, with high volatility indicat-
ing that more attention should be paid to recent history. Results
from lesion studies of the primate ACC suggest that ACC plays
an important role in tracking reward history (Kennerley et al.,
2006) and so ACC responses to volatility would support this
function.
When compared to results from primates, results from studies
in rodents have not produced consistent evidence for a role of the
ACC in risk-guided behaviors. Although inactivation (St. Onge
and Floresco, 2010), lesions (Rivalan et al., 2011), or dopaminer-
gic blockade (St. Onge et al., 2011) of the medial prefrontal cortex
does alter risk-preference, studies that have specifically targeted
the rodent ACC have not reported alterations in risk preference in
two tests of risk preference (St. Onge and Floresco, 2010; Rivalan
et al., 2011).
RISK, DOPAMINE, AND THE NUCLEUS ACCUMBENS
Dopamine plays a central albeit complex role in modulating
the preference for risk. For example, systemic administration of
dopamine D1 and D2 antagonists in rats results in the avoidance
of high-risk/high-reward options in a 2-lever risk-discounting
task (St. Onge and Floresco, 2009) while amphetamine or D1
or D2 agonists increased the preference for high-risk/high-
reward options in the same task (St. Onge and Floresco, 2009).
Conversely, a study that combined the risk of reward with the risk
of punishment (foot shock) reported that systemic administra-
tion of D2 agonists and amphetamine reduced risk taking for sub-
optimal large-reward/punishment options (Simon et al., 2011).
Similarly, another study reported that the systemic application
of D2 antagonists resulted in the avoidance of high-risk/reward
options on a rodent version of the Iowa Gambling Task that
also incorporated punishment in the form of time-outs (Zeeb
et al., 2009). The specific effects of systemic D2 antagonism can
be difficult to interpret given that D2-like receptors are located
on presynaptic dopaminergic afferents and on the postsynaptic
terminals of their cortical and striatal targets (Palij et al., 1990;
Timmerman et al., 1990; Santiago and Westerink, 1991). Taken
together, these results do indicate that dopamine plays a clear but
complex role in risk-guided behaviors, and the specific role may
depend on the task, the presence or absence of punishment, and
the receptor type that is targeted.
Results from single unit-studies of dopaminergic neurons in
the primate VTA also suggest a role of dopamine in evaluating
risk. For example, the activity of dopaminergic neurons follows
the probability of receiving a future reward with the activity of
these neurons peaking when the capacity to predict a reward is
lowest (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Tobler et al., 2005). Similarly, imaging
studies of the midbrain in humans show increased BOLD activa-
tion under conditions of outcome uncertainty (Aron et al., 2004).
The effects of dopaminergic manipulations in humans also sup-
port a role for dopamine in shaping risk preference. For example,
patients undergoing dopamine agonist therapy for the treatment
of Parkinson’s disease and restless leg syndrome exhibit a four-
fold increase in gambling-related problems (Dodd et al., 2005;
Dang et al., 2011), while low doses of amphetamine increase self-
reports of the desire to gamble in problem gamblers (Zack and
Poulos, 2004). Interestingly, the application of antagonists that
targeted only D2 receptors increased the perceived reward of a
slot-machine gambling episode (Zack and Poulos, 2007). Finally,
changes in striatal and cortical dopamine receptor populations
and dopamine transporters (DAT) over an organism’s develop-
ment correspond with age-associated shifts in risk preference
(Wahlstrom et al., 2010).
As in effort-guided decision making, the influence of
dopamine on risk preference may be through dopamine’s regula-
tion of the NAC. For example, inactivation or lesions of the NAC
in rodents reduces the preference for large, uncertain rewards
(Cardinal and Howes, 2005; Stopper et al., 2013). Furthermore,
infusion of D1 antagonists into the NAC of rats decreases the
preference for larger, uncertain rewards on a probability discount-
ing task. In contrast, infusion of a D1 or D2/D3 agonists into
the NAC increases risk preference when reward probability is
high (Norbury et al., 2013; Stopper et al., 2013; however, see
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Mai and Hauber, 2012). Infusion of D1 agonists into the NAC
may also “optimize” decision making in treated animals as one
study reported that treated rats were more likely to choose the
large and uncertain reward when reward probability was high,
but were more likely to avoid this option when probabilities were
low (Stopper et al., 2013). Further, background dopamine levels
appear to peak on trials during which reward delivery is uncer-
tain (St. Onge et al., 2012a). Similarly, one study reported that
BOLD responses in the human NAC were largest under condi-
tions of maximal uncertainty (Preuschoff et al., 2006). In another
study, NAC BOLD activation increased before subjects made risky
choices in a task involving decisions between high (stocks) or
low (bonds) risk investments (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005). These
patterns of activation mirror patterns observed in the firing activ-
ities of dopaminergic neurons of the VTA of non-human primates
(Fiorillo et al., 2003; Tobler et al., 2005).
Taken together, these results suggest that increased NAC
dopamine enhances the tolerance of risk while reductions in NAC
dopamine reduces risk preference. A similar pattern was observed
for effort, with enhancedNAC dopamine resulting in an increased
willingness to work for rewards and reduced dopamine resulting
in effort avoidance. The following section presents possible mech-
anisms by which these similar patterns contribute to the influence
of effort on risk preference.
RISK AND THE BASOLATERAL AMYGDALA
The BLA is also associated with the assessment of risk, although
fewer studies have targeted the BLA relative to the regions dis-
cussed previously. For example, results from a study by Ghods-
Sharifi et al. (2009) suggest that inactivation of the BLA leads
to risk-averse behavior. In this study, animals chose between a
lever that delivered a small, certain reward and a lever that deliv-
ered a large reward with decreasing reinforcement probabilities
that shifted from certain (reward on 100% of trials) to risky
(reward on 12.5% of trials). Rats with bilateral inactivation of
the BLA preferred the low-risk lever when compared to the saline
control. In the same study, the authors investigated effort dis-
counting using a ratio schedule of reinforcement and reported
that BLA lesions also resulted in effort aversion (Ghods-Sharifi
et al., 2009). Taken together, this suggests a general role for the
BLA in overcoming costs associated with both effort and risk.
However, observations from a recent disconnection study per-
formed by the same group suggest that the role of the BLA and
its interaction with other structures is nuanced. In this study, the
authors disconnected the BLA and mPFC and the BLA and the
NAC in a similar risk-discounting task (St. Onge et al., 2012b).
The authors observed that BLA-mPFC disconnection resulted in
increased risk preference while BLA-NAC disconnection resulted
in risk aversion. The study further determined that it was the
mPFC to BLA and not the BLA to mPFC connection that was
involved in enhancing risk-preference. This finding suggests that
the mPFC input to the BLA could serve to blunt risk-seeking so
that animals can optimize foraging behavior over time.
HOW DOES EFFORT ALTER RISK PREFERENCE?
Increased metabolic demands and expenditure of physical effort
can enhance the preference for variable rewards (Caraco, 1980,
1981; Caraco et al., 1990; Kirshenbaum et al., 2003). It has been
proposed that a shift in preference for variable rewards is an adap-
tive behavior that biases animals to gamble on potentially large
and life-sustaining gains (Stephens, 1981). The neural mecha-
nisms underlying the capacity of effort to alter risk preference
are unknown. Broadly, there are at least two routes by which
effort could influence risk. First, the notable intersection between
the neural systems involved in effort and risk-guided behaviors
(e.g., the NAC, ACC, and BLA) and the capacity neurons within
some of these structures to respond to both effort and risk (e.g.,
Kennerley et al., 2009) suggests that activity in these structures
that results from anticipated or experienced effort could alter and
consequently bias the processes within these structures involved
in evaluating risk. Alternatively, it is possible that neural struc-
tures that are not typically associated with effort or risk could
become engaged only when environmental contingencies require
the integration both of these considerations (Burke et al., 2013).
For example, Burke et al. (2013) observed that significant BOLD
activation of the frontal pole was only observed when combina-
tions of effort and risk were being considered. The authors of
this study did not investigate the neural basis for the capacity of
effort to alter risk-preference, and, to our knowledge, no direct
investigation of this question has been performed. It is therefore
hoped that the following and admittedly speculative proposals
will motivate future experiments to fill this gap in understanding.
EFFORT-TRIGGERED INCREASES IN NAC DOPAMINE CONCENTRATION
ENHANCES RISK PREFERENCE
Dopamine is an important modulator of both effort- and risk-
guided behaviors. Here we propose that the release of dopamine
in the NAC in response to physical effort enhances risk prefer-
ence. This idea is supported by the following observations. First,
dopamine concentrations within the NAC increase with physical
exercise (Freed and Yamamoto, 1985). Furthermore, increases in
dopamine concentration are associated with increased risk prefer-
ence in humans (Zack and Poulos, 2004; Dodd et al., 2005; Dang
et al., 2011) and rodents (St. Onge and Floresco, 2009; Stopper
et al., 2013). Finally, stimulation of dopamine D1 receptors within
the NAC enhances risk preference (Stopper et al., 2013; however,
seeMai and Hauber, 2012). Consequently, we propose that effort-
induced increases in NAC dopamine concentration drives risk
preference by enhancing dopamine release in the NAC.
What remains to be specified is the mechanism by which
NAC dopamine concentration is regulated during effort-guided
behaviors. In this regard, the ACC may play a central role
given abundant evidence for ACC involvement in effort-guided
behaviors (Reviewed in section Experimental Approaches for
Studying Effort-Guided Behaviors, Cortical and Sub-Cortical
Circuits Involved in Effort-Guided Behaviors and Dopamine and
Effort-Guided Behavior and see Figure 1). Furthermore, activa-
tion of the ACC is capable of driving the responses of dopaminer-
gic neurons in the VTA (Gariano and Groves, 1988), the principal
source of NAC dopamine. Activity within the dorsomedial pre-
frontal cortex, including the ACC, is also capable of sustaining
motor activity during delay intervals (Narayanan and Laubach,
2006; Narayanan et al., 2006) suggesting that ACC neurons could
sustain dopaminergic responses and enhance dopaminergic tone
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in the NAC during effortful behaviors. The increase in NAC
dopaminergic tone could, as a secondary effect, alter risk-guided
behaviors.
The capacity of the ACC to sustain responses over delays may
be particularly important for maintaining effortful behaviors as
such behaviors often require maintaining motor responses over
seconds and minutes. Consequently, understanding the timescale
of dopamine release in the NAC during effortful behavior may be
critical for understanding its role in modulating risk-preference.
As discussed in section Dopamine and Effort-Guided Behavior,
dopamine release can occur on multiple timescales, and the
timescale most relevant for effort- and risk-guided behaviors has
yet to be determined, although evidence is building that phasic
patterns of dopamine release in the NAC are not critical for effort-
guided behaviors (Gan et al., 2010; Wanat et al., 2010). Instead,
gradual shifts in dopamine release may modulate effort-guided
decision making, facilitate the maintenance of effortful responses,
and sustain a preference for risk. Increases in tonic firing of VTA
neurons correlates with anticipated risk (Fiorillo et al., 2003),
suggesting that effort-induced increases in dopamine may alter
risk-preference.
Interestingly, a recent study has identified within-trial
increases in striatal dopamine concentration that ramps up as
rats approach goal locations on a T-maze (Howe et al., 2013).
These increases appear to be independent of phasic dopamine
release and occur at a faster time scale than typically reported
for changes in background dopamine concentration. The ACC
could potentially drive this ramping response given the capacity
of medial prefrontal neurons to sustain firing activity in afferent
targets (Narayanan and Laubach, 2006; Narayanan et al., 2006).
As suggested by Howe et al. (2013), the ramping response may be
involved in setting the ongoing level of motivation. Determining
the level of motivation could require the integration of factors
such as effort, risk, and expected reward.
EFFORT-TRIGGERED INCREASES IN DOPAMINE ENHANCES LEARNING
UNDER CONDITIONS OF UNCERTAINTY
The preceding account suggests that effort-induced changes
in NAC dopamine enhance risk-preference and provides the
motivational signal required for animals to sustain effortful
behaviors. An alternative mechanism by which effort could
influence risk is through dopamine’s impact on stimulus-
reward learning. Dopamine has an established role in facilitat-
ing such learning (Schultz et al., 1997; Day et al., 2007; Flagel
et al., 2011; Steinberg et al., 2013), and both tonic and pha-
sic patterns of dopamine release appear to enhance plasticity
at hippocampal-NAC synapses (Goto and Grace, 2005). It is
therefore possible that increases in NAC dopamine from both
effort (Freed and Yamamoto, 1985) and risk (Fiorillo et al.,
2003; St. Onge et al., 2012a) could produce an additive effect
on plasticity, and, as a result, an additive effect on stimulus-
reward learning under conditions that combine risk and effort.
Anatomical connectivity between the VTA and the amygdala
(Oades and Halliday, 1987) and the capacity of dopamine to
gate plasticity within the amygdala (Bissière et al., 2003) sug-
gest that enhancements in plasticity could extend to other limbic
structures.
An interesting feature of this idea is that it may account for the
paradoxical capacity of effort to enhance the reinforcing prop-
erties of cues and primary rewards. Pigeons, for example, prefer
colored lights, spatial locations, and primary rewards associated
with high effort (Clement et al., 2000; Friedrich and Zentall,
2004; Singer et al., 2007). Similar observations have been reported
in starlings (Kacelnik and Marsh, 2002), mice (Johnson and
Gallagher, 2011), and humans (Zentall, 2010). Indeed, mice can
express a preference for low- over high-calorie foods when low-
calorie foods are paired with high effort (Johnson and Gallagher,
2011). If effort-triggered dopamine release enhances stimulus-
reward learning in, for example, the amygdala (Bissière et al.,
2003), or striatum (Day et al., 2007; Cerovic et al., 2013), then
such learning could result in a preference for rewards and reward-
predictive cues learned under conditions of effort.
CONCLUSION
The recent trend of using ethologically motivated experimen-
tal design to connect field observations with observations from
neuroscience (Glimcher, 2002; Bateson, 2003; Stephens, 2008;
McNamara and Houston, 2009) has begun to produce interest-
ing results (e.g., Pearson et al., 2009; Hayden et al., 2011; Kolling
et al., 2012). One important insight from foraging research is
that animals are particularly attentive to the variability of reward
delivery, even when average amounts of rewards are held con-
stant (Stephens and Krebs, 1987; Kacelnik and Bateson, 1996).
A second interesting observation is that the preference for such
variability can bemodulated by energetic state (Caraco, 1981) and
physical effort (Kirshenbaum et al., 2003). Although there is com-
pelling behavioral evidence for interactions between effort and
risk, neuroscientific investigations of these interactions have not
been performed. Given the surprising degree of overlap between
networks involved in effort- and risk-guided behaviors, there is
good reason to believe that the neural systems involved in eval-
uating, processing, and setting the preference for effort and risk
interact. Consequently, it is hoped that this review will stimulate
interest in the risk-effort connection and encourage new experi-
ments that investigate the nuanced role that physical effort plays
in foraging and decision making.
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